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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STArfE OF UTAH 
\. 
WESTERN CONTRACTING COR-
PORATION, a .. corporation, ~: 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an original proceeding pursuant to Section 
59-13-46 Utah Code Annotated 1953 for review of 
a decision of the State Tax Commission approving a 
deficiency assessment in plaintiff-taxpayer's corporation 
franchise tax for the calendar year 1962. 
1 
DISPOSITION BY STATE TAX 
COMMISSION 
The Tax Commission, on the basis of a stipulation 
of facts, exhibits, and memoranda submitted by counsel 
for plaintiff and the Commission, approved a deficiency 
assessment as proposed by the Commission's auditin~· 
division. The effect of the approval was to apply a 
"segregated accounting method" in such a way that 
plaintiff's tax assessment was based upon a "construc-
tive" income that greatly exceeded its total net income 
for the year in question. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Tax 
Commission and remand of the case to the Commission 
with directions that it assess plaintiff's franchise tax 
in such a manner that (I) the taxable income will not 
exceed the net income, and ( 2) the assessment will not 
exceed an amount based upon allocation to Utah of 
1 
"the proportion of net income fairly and equitably at· ! 
tributable to the state." 
STATEM.ENT OF FACTS 
'Vestern Contracting Corporation, plaintiff, is an 
Iowa corporation which, since its incorporation in 1~17. 
has had its principal place of business in Sioux City, 
Iowa. It has been qualified to do business in Utah and 
has filed Utah tax returns since August 8, 1955. 
2 
In 1958, plaintiff commenced a stripping contract 
for Kennecott Copper Corporation in Bingham Can-
yon, Gtah. A second stage of the stripping contract was 
commenced in 1960, and completed in 1961. Income 
from a third stage, commenced in 1961 and completed 
in 1962, is the subject of this proceeding. 
During 1962, the company also engaged in major 
constructing activities such as bridge construction, 
dredging, and stripping in the states of Louisiana, 
New Jersey, PennsylYania, California, Iowa, 'Viscon-
sin, and South Dakota. 
In compliance with the provisions of subsection 4 
of Regulation 8, Corporation Franchise Tax Act, issued 
by the State Tax Commission, and dealing with excep-
tions to the statutory method of allocation of net income, 
the plaintiff filed its Utah franchise tax return for 
calendar 1962 using the segregated accounting method, 
and allocated equivalent federal income taxes of $905,-
443.46 against the net income before federal income 
taxes allocated to Utah by this method ($1,741,237.43), 
resulting in net income for Utah corporation franchise 
tax purposes of $835, 793. 97. Plaintiff has regularly 
filed its federal income tax returns using the "completed 
contract" basis of accounting and has used the same 
method of accounting for filing its Utah state franchise 
tax returns. The auditing division has proposed au 
additional assessment of franchise taxes for calendar 
1962 in the amount of $32,913.39 plus interest, based 
primarily on the disallowance of a substantial portion 
of the claimed deduction for federal income taxes. 
3 
Plaintiff reported in 1962 net income before federal 
income taxes of $555,088.31, and paid federal income 
taxes of $183,215.11, resulting in total net income from 
operations in that year of $371,873.20. The proposed 
assessment would create net income assignable to Utah 
of $1,626,985.92. Details of the gross receipts, deduc-
tions, and elements of the allocation factors and specific 
allocation items set forth in the statutory formula are 
itemized in the Stipulation of Facts found on pages 9 
through 15 of the Transcript of Record. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
INCOME ALLOCATED TO UTAH FOR 
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX PUR-
POSES MAY NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL 
NET INCOME OF THE CORPORATION. 
Section 59-13-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 pro· 
vides for a corporation franchise tax as follows: 
" ... equal to 4 per cent of its net income for 
the preceding taxable year computed an? allo· 
cated to this state in the manner heremafter 
provided, or I/20 of l p~r cent of the fair val~e 
during the next precedmg taxable year of 1~s 
tangible property in this state, whichever is 
greater; but in no case shall the tax be less than 
$10." (Emphasis added.) 
For corporations doing business in more than one 
state, 59-13-20 provides for the determination of net 
4 
income in the state of Utah for the purpose of establish-
ing the basis for the imposition of the franchise tax. 
"The portion of net income assignable to busi-
ness <lone within this state, and which shall be 
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this 
chapter, may be determined by an allocation 
upon the basis of the following rules: ... " 
After certain specific allocations of interest, divi-
dends, and gains from the sale or exchange of capital 
assets, subsection 5 of section 59-13-20 provides: 
"If the bank or other corporation carries on 
no business outside this state, the whole of the 
remainder of net income may be allocated to this 
state." 
Subsection 6 sets forth the basic allocation formula 
whereby income from a multi-state corporation is to 
be allocated to the individual states. In these quotations, 
the words "net income" are used repeatedly, indicating 
the intent of the legislature that the franchise tax is to 
be based on the net income of the corporation and that 
specialized rules in apportioning or allocating such 
income where necessary still deal with the same basic 
concept. 
It is not necessary to look outside the statute to 
find the meaning of "net income." Section 59-13-6 
defines it: 
"Net income" means the gross income comput-
ed under section 59-13-5, less the deductions 
allowed by section 59-13-7." 
5 
Gross income is defined in section 59-13-5, with certa[1 
items excluded from gross income for purposes of tht 
franchise tax computation. Similarly, section 59-13·1 
sets forth specified deductions from gross income in 
computing net income. Not all expenses of busines1 
operations are deductions from gross income as defineu 
in the Utah statutes. In applying these various den· 
nition statutes, including particular items of gro.1> 
income and deducting specific items from gross income, 
we derive a statutory concept of "net income" whid1 
in turn is the basis for the application of the corporate 
franchise tax and for the allocation of income for cor· 
porations doing business in more than one state. Any 
allocation of income or tax on income is limited to the 
amount of such income derived pursuant to the statute. 
Even subsection 8 of section 59-13-20, which gives the 
Tax Commission power to allocate to the state of Utah 
income of the taxpayer apart from the general appor· 
tionment statute, provides: 
"If in the judgment of the Tax Commission 
the application of the foregoi~g rules <l~es not 1 
allocate to this state a proport10n of net income 
fairly and equitably attributable to this state, 
it may with such information as it may be able 
to obtain make such allocation as is fairly cal· 
culated to assign to this state the portio~ of 
income reasonablv attributable to the business 
done within this ~tate and to avoid subjectin~ 
the taxpayer to double taxation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The intent of the legislature is clear: the corporate 
" t . e" as franchise tax is to be based upon ne mcom 
6 
<lefine<l in the statute, subject to the minimum taxes and 
an alternative tax based upon tangible property in the 
state. Any method of allocation derived by the Com-
mission under its powers in subsection 8 of section 59-
13-:W or in its regulations interpreting this section are 
subject to the overall limitation of net income. To hold 
otherwise would subject some "gross" income to tax 
rather than "net" income as required. 
Plaintiff's net income after federal income taxes 
for the calendar year 1962 amounted to $371,872.20. 
In accordance with the regulations of the State Tax 
Commission, plaintiff reported its income in Utah for 
the year using segregated accounting and after making 
sume allocation assumptions concerning this income, at 
$835,793.97. This reported amount exceeds 200 per 
cent of the total net income of plaintiff for the calendar 
year 1962. The proposed deficiency assessment by the 
State Tax Commission assigns net income in the amount 
of $1,626,985.92 to business done in Utah, an amount 
which exceeds four times the total net income reported 
by the corporation for the year. The effect of the pro-
posed allocation used by the State Tax Commission 
is to depart from the allocation of net income as defined 
in the statute, and instead to allocate gross income 
found in Utah after the deduction of only specified 
deductions in Utah. 
This Court, in the case of New Park Mining Com-
pan/J v. State Ta.r Cornmission, 113 Utah 410, 196 
P.2d 485 ( 1948), in an attempt to interpret the allow-
anee for depletion, held: 
7 
. "Mining corporations must deduct federal 
mcome and excess profit taxes, before calculat. 
ing. the ~epletion ~llowance to which they are 
entitled m computmg their corporate franchise 
taxes under a statute proYiding that allowance 
for depletion shall be one-third of 'net income' 
from property during the taxable year." 
This depletion deduction is authorized specifically in 
section 59-13-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
provides for this deduction for depletion pursuant to 
rules and regulations prescribed by the State Tax 
Commission. Regulation No. 12 of the State Tax Com· 
mission sets forth the rule for the depletion deduction, 
and establishes an alternative deduction based on cost 
or "33 I/3 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer 
from the property during the taxable year computed 
without allowance for depletion." The same regulation 
later defines net income as follows: 
"Net income from the property must be com· 
puted by deducting from gross income from t~e 
property all deductions allowed by statute m • 
computing taxable net income (excluding the ! 
allowance for depletion) to the extent that ~h~y ' 
are applicable to the property. The reqw~1te 
deduction shall include overhead and operatmg 
expenses, development costs to extent claimed , 
or allowed as a deduction on the return, depre· 
ciation, taxes, including federal income taxes, ' 
losses sustained, etc." 
It is clear, therefore, that both the Tax Commission 
"d d h h t "net and the legislature have dec1 e t at t e erm 
income" as used in certain of the sections of the chapter 
8 
dealing with corporate franchise taxes refers to defined 
"net income"-gross income from items taxable in Utah 
less specified deductions. 
This term has also been defined in many cases m 
many jurisdictions. The following are typical: 
"A tax may be imposed only upon 'net in-
come' which is defined as the gross income of 
the taxpayer, less the deductions and exemptions 
allowed by law.'' 1rlorlcy v. Remmel, 221 S.,V. 
2d 51; 215 Ark. 434. 
"Net income, or earnings, are the products of 
a business, deducting the expenses only." Jones 
& Nimick Mfy. Co. v. Commonwealth, 69 Pa. 
137. 
"Net income means profit, and profit is de-
rived, in any business in which capital is lost 
or depleted, only after the expenses of conduct-
ing the business are paid, and return is made 
of the capital inwsted which is gone.'' Carter v. 
Phillips, 212 Pac. 747, 88 Okla. 202 (1923). 
"Necessarily, net income for tax purposes 
is a conception of the income tax statute, and 
amount arrived at is ascertained by deducting 
from gross amount of income received by tax-
payer from all sources, the specified deductions 
allowed to it by statute, even though for cor-
porate purposes only, net income may be arrived 
at by the deduction of entries and accounts not 
perr~issible for tax a ti on pnrposes." American 
Can Co. v. Bowers, 35 F.2d 832 (1929). 
"The words 'net income' being used in their 
common and usual meaning mean the income 
remainin u after the deduction of all charges, 
"' 
9 
outlay, loss, etc." People e.l' rel. Standard Oil 
Company of New York 'l'. Law, 200 N.Y.S. 72 
205 App. Div. 531. . 
"The state legislature in taxing net income 
cannot exclude as deductions from gross income 
such i~ems as. ordin~ry and necessary expenses 
?f domg busmess, mcluding salaries, rentals, 
mterest, losses, and bad debts." Cook v. Walters 
Dry Goods Co., 206 S.,i\T.2d 742, 212 Ark. 485. 
An attempt by the State Tax Commission to tax 
more than net income of the corporation, as being 
properly allocable to Utah, violates the commerce clause, 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Federal Consti· 
tution. In the case of Gwin, White & Prince v. Henne· 
ford, 305 U.S. 434, 83 L.Ed. 272, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1938), 
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting a 
state tax said: 
"The present tax, though nominally local, 
thus in its practical operation discriminates 
against interstate commerce, since it imposes 
upon it, merely because interstate commerce is 
being done, the risk of a multiple burden to whic.h 
local commerce is not exposed." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In that case, the court said that the application of the 
statute discriminated against interstate commerce. The 
same would appear to be true in the case of the Utah 
Corporation Franchise Tax Act. If the State Tax 
Commission interprets it in such a way that a company 
doing business in interstate commerce can be forced to 
pay a greater tax under that interpretation of the Act 
10 
than a corporation doing business solely within the State 
of Utah, the taxing statute discriminates against inter-
state commerce. Such a result is obvious in the case in 
point. If plaintiff were a Utah corporation, it would 
pay tax only on its total net income. It is inequitable 
to require plaintiff to pay tax under the Utah Franchise 
Tax provisions on any amount in excess of net income 
simply because the corporation is doing business in inter-
state commerce. 
In a Pennsylvania case where the starting point 
for allocation is net income, not as determined by state 
statute, but as returned to and ascertained by the federal 
government, a company had an overall net loss on its 
federal return, but it had a net gain in Pennsylvania. 
In denying the Commonwealth the authority to tax 
gain, the court said: 
"\Ve are unable to comprehend how a net loss 
can be construed as net income. The tax is 
levied on each dollar of net income, not on each 
dollar of net loss. If we are correct in this hypoth-
esis, there is no net income as defined ... to be 
allocated and apportioned ... in which event 
no tax is due for the period involved." 
The court went on to say: 
"The Act imposes no tax on a net loss, and 
when there is a net loss there is no net income 
to be allocated or apportioned." Commonwealth 
v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co., 83 D & C 326, 
62 Dauph l (Pa. Common Pleas, 1952). 
\\There a legislature has intended a different result, 
the statute has clearly said so. For example, in the 
11 
case of Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Galloway, 175 
Ore. 524, 154 P.2d 539 ( 1944), the Oregon Supreme 
Court said in connection with this question: 
"Is it essential that a corporation which does 
business both within and without this state ... 
had a net over-all income before the defendants 
are authorized to assess against it the corporatiou 
excise tax ... or will it suffice if the corporation's 
Oregon business yielded a net income; . . . " 
In answering this question, the court said: 
"Manifestly, when the legislature wrote our 
statute, it could have embraced either the propo· 
sition submitted by the plaintiffs or the one for 
which the defendants contend1 that is, it could 
have made the Act provide that no corporation 
doing business both within and without Oregon 
should be liable for a tax unless its total opera· 
tions resulted in a net income; or it could have 
provided that all corporations should be subject 
to the tax if their Oregon business yielded a net 
return regardless of the results achieved in other 
states. Obviously, one or the other proposition 
was embraced by the legislature. A choice was 
necessarily made. In determining which was 
chosen, we must of course look to the statute. 
llence, the first of the two issues calls for nothing 
more than statutory construction." 
The court then analyzed the statutory provisions and 
decided that the Oregon tax base was net income from 
within Oregon. The most pertinent statutory words 
were found to be: 
"The determination of net income shall b~ 
based upon the business done within the state. 
12 
The Utah statute does not define net income for Utah 
franchise tax purposes in the same way that the Oregon 
statute defined it for Oregon purposes. Rather, our 
statute clearly indicates that the net income of the tax-
payer everywhere is to be assig11able to business done 
within the state, based on a statutory formula, subject 
to a modification of that statutory formula in unusual 
cases, but still dealing with "the portion of net income" 
as a limiting factor. 
It follows that the maximum amount of net income 
that could be allocated to Utah under any formula 
devised by the State Tax Commission in the event 
that the statutory formula does not equitably allocate 
the correct amount of income to Utah, is $371,873.20, 
the total net income of plaintiff for the calendar year 
1962. Any holding to the contrary is in direct conflict 
with the terms of the statute, the normal meaning of 
the term net income, and the requirement of the statute 
that the taxpayer is not to be subjected to double 
taxation. 
II 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO USE THE 
STATUTORY ALLOCATION FORMULA IN 
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT OF INCOME 
SUBJECT TO TAX IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Section 59-13-20 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 
sets forth the procedure to be followed in determining 
13 
the net income allocated to the State of Utah. This 
section begins : 
"The portion of net income assignable to busi· 
ness d~ne within this state, and which shall be 
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this 
chapter, may be determined by an allocation 
upon the basis of the following rules: ... " (Em. 
phasis added.) · 
Following subsections provide for the specific alloca· 
tion of certain items such as interest, dividends, and 
gains from the sale or exchange of a ca pita} asset. Sub· 
section 6 sets forth the allocation formula to be used 
for taxpayers doing business in more than one state, 
as follows: 
" ( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries 
on any business outside this state, the said re· 
mainder may be divided into three equal parts: 
" (a) Of one third, such portion shall be al· 
tributed to business carried on within this state 
as shall be found by multiplying said third by 
a fraction whose numerator is the value of the 
corporation's tangible property situated within 
this state and whose denominator is the value of 
all the corporation's tangible property wherever 
situated. 
" ( b) Of another third, such portion shall ~i 
attributed to business carried on within this 
state as shall be found by multiplying said thir! 
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amo~n 
expended by the corporation for ~ages, s.alar1e1 
commissions or other compensation to its err 
ployees and assignable to this .state and whm 
denominator is the total expenditures of the co 
14 
-
poration for wages, salaries, comrmss10ns, or 
other compensation to all of its employees. 
" ( c) Of the remaining third, such portion 
shall be attributed to business carried on within 
th~s state as sh.all be found by multiplying said 
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount 
of the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to this state, and whose denominator 
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts 
from all its business. 
" ( d) The amount assignable to this state of 
expenditures of the corporation for wages, sal-
aries, commissions or other compensation to its 
employees shall be such expenditures for the tax-
able year as represent the compensation of 
employees not chiefly situated at, connected with 
or sent out from, premises for the transaction of 
business owned or rented by the corporation 
outside this state. 
" ( e) The amount of the corporation's gross 
receipts from business assignable to this state 
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the 
taxable year from 
" (1st) Sales, except those negotiated or 
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents 
or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with 
or sent out from premises for the transaction 
of business owned or rented by the corporation 
outside this state, and sales otherwise determined 
by the tax commission to be attri?utable to the 
business conducted on such premises, 
" (2nd) Rentals or royalties from P.ro_p-
erty situated, or from the use of patents, w1thm 
this state. 
"(f) The value of the corporation's tangible 
15 
property for the purpose of this section shall 
be the average value of such property during the 
taxable year." 
Subsection 8 of this statute provides: 
"If in the judgment of the tax commission 
the application of the foregoing rules does not 
allocate to this state the proportion of net income 
fairly and equitably attributable to this state 
it may with such information as it may be ab!~ 
to obtain make such allocation as is fairly calcu· 
lated to assign to this state the portion of net 
income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state and to avoid subjecting 
the taxpayer to double taxation." 
The legislature must have intended the allocation 
formula, combined with the specific allocations of par· 
ticular items, to be the normal method by which multi· 
state corporations would pay a tax to the State of 
Utah on a proportionate share of their income. It is 
only in the event that the application of the general 
formula does not allocate to this state the proportion 
of net income fairly and equitably attributable to the 
state that the Tax Commission has the power to depart 
from the formula. 
This Court has considered this subsection in two 
cases germane to our discussion. Justice "\Volf e, con· 
curring in part and dissenting in part, in the case ~f 
California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Commis· 
sion, 97 Utah 367, 93 P .2d 463 ( 1939), made the follow· 
ing statement: 
16 
"The very reading of subsection 8 precludes 
any o~her constructio~1 (referring to the depar-
ture from the allocation rules when that is re-
quired to be fair to either the state or the tax-
payer). In determining the portion of net income 
assignable to business done within this state, the 
Commission 'may' use a rule set out in the main 
opinion. This does not mean that the Commission 
may ignore the rules and choose its own. 'May' 
has the meaning of 'r.;hould,' i.e., should fallow 
the rules unless the rules fail to accomplish the 
overarching purpose as revealed by subsectiou 
8. It is only in case an application of the rules 
as laid down fails to allocate to this state the 
proportion of net income fairly and equitably 
attributable to this state, or on the other hand, 
where the rules would subject the taxpayer to 
so-called double taxation that the Commission 
may depart from them." 
The same approach was used in the case of Kenne-
cott Copper Company, et al. v. State 1'ax Commission, 
118 Utah 140, 221 P.2d 857 ( 1950), in which Justice 
Pratt made the following comment: 
"'¥ e have decided that the Commission 'should' 
follow the legislative formula, unless it fails to 
accomplish the purpose of the formula. '¥ith 
such a foundation upon which to act, neither the 
Commission nor this court should reject the for-
mula because of the laborious t~k possihly at-
tendent upon its (lpplicatiu11." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Thus it is clear that the legislature intended that, 
except in most unuusal cases, the statutory formula 
set forth in subsections 1 through 7, inclusiYe, should 
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be applied, and that consistent with such legislativ, 
intent this court has held that subsection 8 should bi 
applied only in most unusual cases. 
The Court has gone further and said that eve11 
if subsection 8 is applied, any formula so devised mus! 
be equitable to the taxpayer and to all others similarlr 
situated. A taxpayer conducting a unitary business such 
as this plaintiff, operating in several states, should be 
subject to tax only on a reasonably allocable portion 
of such income in any of the individual states. The 
statutory formula was designed to accomplish this 
purpose. 
The Commission, pursuant to the authority of 
subsection 8, has adopted Regulation No. 8. Subsection 
4 of that Regulation reads as follows: 
"Exceptions to statutory method. It is the 
policy of the Tax Commission, based upon court 
interpretations of the statute, to require that the 
1nethod set forth in the statute be used for th.e 
assignment of net income within and without thu 
state." (Emphasis added.) 
This subsection of the Regulation goes on to outline 
the Tax Commission's authority to modify this statutory 
formula and pursuant to this power makes the following 
prov1s1on: 
"The segregated accounting. n_iethod is g~~­
erally required in the case of mmmg c~mpame d 
contractors ranch and farm corporations, a~ 
1 may be re~uired in the case of certain financ1a 
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ins~itutions or other corporations upon audit and 
review of the returns filed, if necessary to produce 
a reasonable result." 
The intent of the legislature in using the statutory 
formula to determine the amount of income that should 
be assigned to Utah where corporations are "doing 
business" both in and outside Utah, is set forth by the 
Commission in the same subsection 4 of Regulation 8: 
"There is a strong presumption that the ap-
plicatiun of the statutory method of assigning 
net income will produce a reasonable allocation 
of net income within and without this state, and 
it must be used in all cases except those in which 
the Tax Commission has determined that an 
exception should be made. It should be empha-
sized that the statutory method may produce an 
income assignment substantially different _from 
that produced by some other method (such as 
segregated accounting), but that fact alone is 
not sufficient to justify an exception. It must 
be shown that the factors of the formula when 
applied to the particular business at hand could 
not be expected to produce a reasonable alloca-
tion because of a variance from normal situations 
with respect to property, wages, and salaries, 
receipts, rents, interests, dividends, etc., suffi-
cient to invalidate the assumption of a reasonable 
allocation.'' 
There is no reason why the formula should not be 
applied to determine the amount of income assignable 
to Utah from its operations in Utah. The application 
of the formula does fairly and equitably apportion net 
income to Utah, and the burden of proof in overcoming 
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the presumption is not met by the Commission when 
it arbitrarily holds that contractors must depart from 
the formula. 
The problem of taxing income from multi-state 
operations is a complicated one. All states have recog-
nized this problem, and have developed apportiorunent 
formulas in order to tax the income from these cor· 
porations so that they would bear a fair share of the cost 
of government in the various states in which they did 
business. A substantial majority of these states hare 
adopted a three-factor apportionment formula similar 
to the one set forth in the Utah statute. The states of 
California, Idaho, Arizona, and Oregon have adopted 
a formula using substantially the same three factors 
to determine the amount of net income properly assign· 
able to an individual state from these multi-state cor· 
porations. In the application of these allocation formulas 
it has become important to determine whether the 
business of the multi-state corporation is unitary or 
nonunitary in nature, in that the statutory allocation 
formulas are generally applicable to the unitary type 
business, whereas the nonunitary businesses lend them· 
selves appropriately to allocation by the use of separate 
accounting methods. The Utah State Tax Commission 
has apparently decided that contractors and certain 
other types of businesses are "nonunitary" in nature 
and therefore should file their returns on the basis of 
separate accounting. 
Plaintiff carries on a unitary type business, even 
though many of the activities necessary in the perform· 
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ance of the particular contract in question were per-
formed entirely within the state of Utah. The factors 
supporting this contention are as follows: 
Plaintiff's only permanent office is in Sioux City, 
Iowa. Temporary offices are opened in connection with 
each major project at the job sites. The executive, 
administrative, and financial offices of the corporation 
are in Sioux City. There the President and other prin-
cipal officers have their offices, the Board of Directors 
regularly holds its meetings, and all of the general 
company personnel, including the chief engineer, the 
chief accountant, and managers of the various depart-
ments (such as highway construction, heavy construc-
tion, marine construction, special projects, materials 
production, and equipment) are located. 
Plaintiff hires people on a permanent basis from 
the Sioux City area, including project managers, proj-
ect accountants, project engineers, construction super-
intendents, and master mechanics. These employees 
move from project to project and sometimes are trans-
ferred before a project is completed. The only people 
hired by plaintiff at a project are laborers and some 
clerical help. 
Plaintiff's property and equipment are maintained 
in Sioux City. Equipment is purchased by the manager 
of the equipment department and is transferred from 
job to job. When a project is commenced, the project 
manager is given a control list of suppliers by the 
executive personnel from whom he can acquire major 
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items to be used at the project. Repair parts and minor 
supplies are purchased locally. Major purchases, such 
as dynamite, for many of the construction jobs are made 
or specifically approved at the offices in Sioux City. 
Each project maintains a separate set of books for 
that project and prepares and forwards to the home 
office weekly and monthly reports. The project payroll 
is prepared at the job site. Depreciation and overhead 
costs are a pp lied to the monthly and weekly reports in 
Sioux City, and the financial statements of the cor· 
poration are prepared at the general accounting offices. 
All receipts from the various projects are processed 
through Sioux City. The banking functions are all 
handled by the home office. Payroll checks are prepared 
locally and signed locally. All invoices are matched 
against purchase orders at the individual project offices, 
where the checks in payment of those invoices are 
prepared. These checks, together with the approved 
invoices, are forwarded to the main off ices of the com· 
pany, where they are signed by the chief accountant. 
The chief accountant periodically transfers money to 
the local bank accounts from the general account of 
the company in order to cover the local payroll checks i 
on each project. 
All permanent records in connection with the pay-
rolls on the individual projects are maintained in Sioux 
City and the quarterly payroll reports to the variou) ! 
governmental organizations are prepared there. 
A permanent staff of approximately forty-five 
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persons is maintained at the Sioux City offices. The 
individual project managers are called there regularly 
to review progress on individual jobs. All bidding, 
major supply purchasing, and equipment purchases are 
handled from the head office. All important decisions 
in connection with the individual projects, including 
modifications on these projects, are cleared with Sioux 
City. The functions handled by the individual project 
managers could be classified as ministerial in nature, 
with all of the managerial functions performed by per-
sonnel at the headquarters of the company. 
Plaintiff contends, based on the above factors, that 
it is unitary in nature and therefore the allocation for-
mula should be applied to its total net income for the 
purpose of determining the fair and equitable portion 
of such net income that should be taxed in the state of 
Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court in interpreting 
a statute that is very similar to the Utah statute clearly 
set forth the rule in connection with the use of an 
apportionment formula. In Butler Bros v. McColgan, 
315 U.S. 501, 86 L.Ed. 991, 62 S.Ct. 701 (1942), the 
court said, quoting from Hans Rees Sons v. North 
Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 75 L.Ed. 904, 51 S.Ct. 385 
(1931) : 
"The enterprise of a corporation which mam~­
factures and sells its manufactured products is 
ordinarily a unitary busines~ and all the ~act?rs 
in that enterprise are essential to the realization 
of profUs." ( Enwhasis added.) 
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The court went on to say that by the same token, the 
~tate of California could treat the appellant's business 
m that case as a unitary one, and justified its ruling on 
the following factors: 
, "The:re is ~nity of ownership and management. 
The operation of the central buying division 
alone demonstrates that functionally the various 
branches are closely integrated." 
In that case, the appellant operated branch wholesale 
distributing houses in several states, including one at 
San Francisco, California. Each of these branches 
maintained a stock of goods, served a separate terri· 
tory, had its own sales force, handled its own sales, 
and all solicitations, credit and collection arrangements 
in connection therewith, and kept its own books of 
account. All the purchases made for the various whole· 
sale distributing houses were made through a central 
buying division, the goods ordered being shipped by the 
manufacturer directly to the houses for which they 
were ordered. The cost of the goods and the transpor· 
tation charges were entered on the books of the house 
which received the goods. No charges were made against 
that particular house for the benefit of any of the houses 
by reason of the centralized purchasing. The actual 
cost of operating the centralized buying division was 
allocated among the houses. The greater part of the 
appellant's other operating expenses was incurred 
directly and exclusively at the respective houses. Cer· 
tain items benefiting all of the distributing houses were 
paid by the appellant and allocated to them. Included 
24 
in such expenses were executive salaries, certain account-
ing expenses, the cost of operating the central buying 
division, and the central advertising division. Except 
for these common expenses, each house was operated 
independently of each other house. The California 
house, keeping its books using generally accepted ac-
counting principles, and after allocation of common 
expenses, reported a loss of approximately $82,000, 
while the total profit for all of the houses was approxi-
mately $1,150,000. The court continued: 
"We cannot say that property, payroll, and 
sales are inappropriate ingredients of an appor-
tionment formula. \Ve agree with the Supreme 
Court of California that these factors may prop-
erly be deemed to reflect 'the relative contribu-
tion of the activities in the various states to the 
production of the total unitary income' so as to 
allocate to California its just proportion of the 
profits earned by appellant from his unitary 
business." 
Similar factors were used in Crawford Mfg. Co. v. 
State Commission of Revenite and Taxation, 180 Kan. 
352, 304 P.2d 504 (1956), wherein the Supreme Court 
of Kansas held: 
"A multi-state business is a unitary business 
for income tax purposes when the operations 
conducted in one state benefit and are benefited 
by the operations conducted in a~other state or 
states. If its various parts are mterdependent 
and of mutual benefit so as to form one integral 
business rather than seyeral business entities, it 
1s unitary. 
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"The essential _test to be applied is whether 
or not .t111~ operat10n <:>f the portion of the busi· n~ss w1t m the state is dependent upon or con-
tributory to the operation of the business outsid 
the s~ate. ~f there is such relationship, the busi~ 
ness is unitary." 
The functions performed by the management and 
general off ice personnel of plaintiff are considerably 
more involved than those in the Butler Bros. case, supr~. 
and it appears therefore that under the factors con· 
sidered by the U. S. Supreme Court, plaintiff's opera· 
tion is clearly a unitary business, and that therefore the 
formula for determining the portion of income allocable 
to Utah should be followed in this case. All of the 
activities of the corporation, both within and without 
the state of Utah, contributed to the realization of 
profits by the corporation. 
III 
THE STATE TAX CO.MMISSION ERRED 
IN REFUSING TO ALLO'V THE DEDUC· 
TION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES ON A 
SEPARATE ACCOUNTING BASIS. 
In the event this Court finds that the net income 
limitation is inapplicable to the operations of plaint.iff 
in Utah for the calendar year 1962, and that the plam· 
tiff is not entitled to use the statutory formula 
10 
, 
determine the amount of income to be allocated to Ut~h. 
and further decides that the petitioner must file ,its 
returns using the separate or segregated accounting 
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method, a deduction for federal income taxes computed 
on an equivalent basis is a part of such segregated 
accounting. 
Segregated accounting means that the taxpayer is 
keeping a separate set of records for the determination 
of net income from business done within a particular 
division of a business. This means that the taxpayer 
accounts for gross revenues and deductions on an indi-
vidual state or unit basis rather than by total amounts 
for the operations of the company. Separate account-
ing is ordinarily appropriate for businesses of a non-
unitary nature and has been applied to an oil business 
doing all production, manufacturing and refining out-
side the taxing state, particularly where local sales out-
lets were charged at the market price of products 
received from the outside producers and refiners, to 
disconnected railroad lines in different states and to 
world-wide operations. 
The purpose of independent unit, or segregated 
accounting is not to raise additional revenue but to 
prevent the imposition of an unconstitutional tax; 
separate accounting (particularly without legislative 
sanction) cannot be forced on a taxpayer without his 
consent. Ordinarily, separate accounting is claimed by 
certain taxpayers in order to prevent taxing a dis-
proportionate part of income regardless of the type 
of company or income, if not geared or related to tax-
able privilege or incident. 
This is just contrary to the situation with plaintiff 
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m this case. The plaintiff's gross profit arising from 
its contract operations in Utah exceeded its gross profits 
in other states. If the Commission has power to force 
contractors to file their returns using a segregated 
accounting method, this indicates that the Commission 
wants a separate determination of the amount of income 
earned in U tab. The logical result of such a determi· 
nation is that all income and expenses directly attribut· 
able to Utah should be accounted for in Utah, and those 
costs that are general throughout the company should 
be allocated to Utah on some reasonable basis. The 
basis of allocation used by the plaintiff is not in question 
in this proceeding with the exception that the amount 
of the deduction for federal income taxes deducted by 
plaintiff is in conflict with Regulation No. 13 issued 
by the State Tax Commission. In that regulation, the 
Commission takes the position that it does not recognize 
for Utah Corporation Franchise Tax purposes the 
so-called "tax savings" resulting from loss items. "Red 
figure" allocations of federal income taxes are not ac· 
cepted. Loss items or divisions must not be assigned 
any federal income tax either positive or negative. In 
effect, the Commission is saying that only those items 
that produce a profit should have any federal income 
tax deduction allocated against them, and that those 
items that produce a loss have no effect on federal 
income taxes. This result is absurd. Federal income 
taxes are paid on the basis of the net income of th_e 
h · f ind1· taxpaying unit, not on t e net mcome o any 
d. · · or vidual components of that unit. Those ms1ons 
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portions of the unit that have a loss for the period 
have the effect of reducing the taxes paid by the profit-
making divisions of the taxpaying unit. To say that 
only the divisions of the taxpaying unit that contribute 
a profit to the organization affected the federal income 
tax in any given taxable period is simply not in agree-
ment with the facts of the taxing statute. Regulation 
No. 13 therefore is contrary to a proper determination 
of net income using the segregated accounting method 
and is not consistent with the Commission's express 
desire to use segregated accounting in connection with 
contractors. 
The use of segregated accounting means that all 
income and expense items should be specifically deter-
mined for the particular business done in the State 
of Utah, and this should logically result in a separate 
determination of federal income taxes for that par-
ticular unit. Federal income taxes are the single most 
expensive item of cost that most businesses incur, and 
to say that net income can be determined by using a 
federal income tax deduction which has been reduced 
because of losses in other states has the effect of taxing 
only "net income before federal income taxes" earned 
in the State of Utah pursuant to the segregated account-
ing method. 
Section 59-13-7, subsection 3, provides specifically, 
"Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year" are 
deductions in the determination of net income. It is 
an accepted accounting procedure to use the so-called 
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"red figure" method of determining federal income 
taxes where apportionments are necessary between 
departments, divisions, or operating units of a par-
ticular taxpayer. The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, in its Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 43, pages 87 to 92,deals with this subject as it relates 
to the proper allocation of income tax to a corporation 
that is deducting for tax purposes accelerated deprecia-
tion or amortization, or where there is any other substan-
tial difference between income per books and income per 
tax return. The Institute position in this matter is 
that the financial statements of any given period should 
show as a deduction the income tax properly paid, 
based upon generally accepted accounting principles, 
without regard to the amount actually set up as the 
tax liability based on the tax returns filed. The most 
popular elementary accounting textbook, Finney & 
Miller's Sixth Edition, in its chapter on departmental 
operations, page 369, clearly indicates that a depart-
ment that has a loss should have a negative tax figure 
assigned to it for the purpose of determining the true 
net income or loss from that particular department. 1 
All accountants who prepare certified financial state· 
ments use the theory of tax allocation in making adjust-
ments for taxes where the statements based on good 
accounting principles differ from the statements filed 1 
for tax purposes. Either a prepaid tax account or a 
tax liability account is set up to account for the differ-
ence between the amounts paid to the taxing authorities 
and the amount properly accrued based upon the re· , 
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portable income of a company for other than tax pur-
poses. 
·'Segregated" means 1Jegregated, and it is not 
within the authority of the Tax Commission in its 
allocation of net income, '·as is fairly calculated to 
assign to this state the portion of net income reasonably 
attributable to the business done within this state and 
to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation," 
for it to attempt to force the determination of gross 
income and specific expenses in Utah using the seg-
regated accounting method and then rely upon the total 
federal income taxes paid by the corporation based on 
its total operations for the purpose of determining the 
amount of the deduction for federal income taxes. If 
the Commission wants a separate determination of net 
income in Utah, then the amount deductible for federal 
income taxes in Utah should be the amount based upon 
the income before taxes determined separately in the 
State of Utah rather than the amount of taxes paid 
based on the total net income, including loss operations 
in other operating divisions of the company. 
The calculation of the amount of such taxes is a 
relatively simple matter. The net income before taxes 
allocated to U tab is simply multiplied by the applicable 
tax rates of the federal income tax law for the year in 
question. The plaintiff filed its return on this basis and 
deducted federal taxes of $905,443.46. The Tax Com-
mission seems to be in a position of saying, "Since you 
had more net income in the state of Utah than for the 
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total operations of the company, we will depart from 
the allocation formula, but because the losses in other 
states contributed to a reduction in federal income taxes 
we will limit your deduction for federal income tax 
purposes to the amount paid on net income after deduct-
ing those losses." 
Even the Commission appears to recognize the 
necessity of matching income within the state of Utah, 
that created federal income tax, against such taxes, 
when it finds in its conclusion of law, No. 4: 
"The taxpayer is entitled to deduct no more 
than the portion of federal taxes paid which 
pertains or relates to income from its Utah oper· 
ations against its Utah income for Utah franchise 
tax purposes." (Emphasis added.) 
The amount of federal taxes pertaining or relating to 
income from Utah operations is substantially in excess 
of the total federal taxes paid based on net income from 
operations in all states. If the Tax Commission can 
base the tax on a "constructive net income," it should 
have no difficulty in determining a "constructive" 
federal tax on that income. 
IV 
THE PURPORTED C 0 NT RAC 'f OR 
AGREEl\!IENT TO FILE UTAH CORPORA· 
TION FRANCHISE TAX RETURNS USING 
THE SEGREGATED ACCOUNTING METH· 
OD IS NOT BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF. 
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Methods of accounting and the accounting periods 
to be followed by franchise taxpayers are set forth in 
5H3-15 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
"'fhe net income shall be computed upon the 
basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period 
(fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) 
and in accordance with the method of accounting 
regularly employed in keeping the books of said 
taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting 
has been so employed, or if the method employed 
does not clearly reflect the income, the compu-
tation shall be made in accordance with such 
method as in the opinion of the tax commission 
does clearly reflect the income." 
The Tax Commission is authorized, if at all, to require 
a taxpayer to enter into an agreement by which tax-
payer gives up some rights in order for the taxpayer 
to receive permission to use its regular method of 
accounting employed on its books, only when such 
method of accounting does not clearly reflect the income 
of the taxpayer. This burden of showing that such 
method does not clearly reflect income is on the Tax 
Commission and would be extremely difficult to sustain 
in that the federal tax regulations and generally ac-
cepted accounting principles both permit the use of 
the completed contract method of accounting as an 
accepted method. See Accounting Research Bulletin, 
No. 45, American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (October, 1955). 
The Tax Commission's use of such an agreement 
(pages 17 and 18 of the Transcript of Record) is based 
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upon its concern that a contractor reporting 011 th 
completed contract method might complete a contrac 
in Utah and withdraw from Utah without paying an1 
corporation franchise tax on the amount of net inco~1 
earned on such contract. The agreement requires, there 
fore, that if taxpayer reports its income on the com 
pleted contract basis it agrees to waive the statute 0 
limitations and agrees to certain other covenants ir 
consideration of the Tax Commission's agreement tr 
accept the filing of corporation franchise tax return 
using the completed contract method of accounting 
Such agreement recites that the Commission require~ 
the filing of corpora ti on franchise tax returns usini 
the accrual or percentage of contract completion basis 
and a separate accounting basis. The Tax Commissior 
does not have the authority to require the use of thi~ 
accrual or percentage of completion method of account 
ing, and it is questionable whether it has the authoriti 
to require the use of separate accounting by a taxpayer 
whose regularly employed accounting method "clear!) 
reflects the income" of the taxpayer. Plaintiff signei 
the purported agreement on October 25, 1962, under 
the assumption that such an agreement was within tht 
power of the Tax Commission and with the desire tc 
comply with the rules and regulations set forth by 
such Tax Commission. The agreement provides thal 
plaintiff would report all income received or earnea 
as a result of its operations in Utah on its corporation 
franchise tax returns. The agreement did not conunil 
the plaintiff to file its returns using the separate method 
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of accounting. The comment "all income derived from 
its Utah contracts completed while it is qualified as 
a corporation in Utah," however, does indicate that 
the Commission intended the separate accounting 
method to apply here. Plaintiff contends that the con-
tract is not binding in that the State Tax Commission 
does not have the power to enter into this type of an 
agreement and that there was no consideration for the 
agreement because the plaintiff was entitled to file its 
returns using the method of accounting consistently 
employed by it without the Commission's per1mss1on. 
"Unless there is ratification by the State, 
the State is not bound by a contract made by its 
agents without authority conferred on them by 
statute or by the Constitution." 81 C.J.S., 
States, p. 1087. 
This statement appears to set forth the general rule in 
connection with the powers of officers of a state. Such 
officers have only the powers expressly granted to them 
by statute, and there appears to be no express authority 
in the Utah statutes authorizing the Commission to 
enter into the type of agreement involved in this case. 
Certain commissions functioning as part of the state 
government have been given specific power. In Camp-
bell Building Company v. State Road Commission, 
95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), this court said: 
"The statute empowers the State Road Com-
mission to bind the state by written contracts 
and it is only on such written 'contract that it may 
be sued. The state cannot be held for the acts of 
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its engineer beyond the powers conferred by 
law or the written contract." 
Interpreting the powers of the State Tax Commission, 
this court said in Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 
P.2d 1085 (1935): 
"As a general rule, the taxing officers of the 
state, county, or municipal corporation, may not 
compromise or release claims for taxes legally 
assessed unless empowered to do so by statute." 
The statute setting forth the general powers and 
duties of the Tax Commission, 59-5-46 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, authorizes the Commission to pre· 
scribe regulations and rules, and to exercise supervision 
over the administration of the tax laws. In this con-
nection, the Commission is to exercise all powers neces-
sary in the performance of its duties, but there is 
nothing which expressly authorizes the Commission to 
make contracts with taxpayers concerning their method 
of accounting or modifying the statutory requirements 
in connection with the filing of Utah corporation fran· 
chise tax returns. If the use of the completed contract 
accounting method were not a generally accepted method 
of accounting, or if such method did not clearly reflect 
the income of the taxpayer, it is possible that the Com· 
sion's power might include entering into an agreement 
to accept the method of accounting used by the tax· 
payer in consideration of the taxpayer agreeing to 
certain conditions prescribed by the Commission. Even 
conceding such power, the particular agreement in 
question is void for lack of consideration in that the 
36 
Commission covenanted only to accept the filing of 
corporation franchise tax returns on a completed con-
tract basis, which method was within the express pro-
visions of the statute. The Commission's permission to 
use an accounting method in lieu of a method it could 
not force the use of is not consideration and the contract 
is therefore void and of no effect, and does not preclude 
the taxpayer from asserting its rights to file its tax 
return under a method differing from that of the sepa-
rate accounting method implied in the agreement. 
The contract is also void in that it is against public 
policy to deprive a taxpayer of the express right to 
judicial review on the question of the reasonableness 
of the accounting system which the taxpayer is required 
to use. Section 59-13-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provides for review by this court of decisions of the 
State Tax Commission on questions involving the fran-
chise tax. Encompassed within this right to judicial 
review would be the determination of the reasonableness 
of the accounting method and the Commission should 
not be able to restrict the scope of review by contracts 
purporting to bind the taxpayer to a particular method 
of accounting. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
State Tax Commission of Utah are clearly erroneous 
to the extent they hold that plaintiff does not conduct 
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a unitary business, and that any allocation of net incom: 
to Utah for corporation franchise tax purposes is 110: 
limited to the total net income of the plaintiff frut~ 
its total operations. To the extent that separate account 
ing is a valid method of determining net income allo 
cated to Utah, "equivalent" federal income taxes a11 
a proper deduction in establishing such net income a: 
a basis for franchise taxes. 
The State Tax Commission has failed to establisr 
the necessity of departing from the statutory allocatio1 
formula so plaintiff is entitled to use this formula i1 
determining its net income properly allocable to Utal 
for franchise tax purposes. 
In the alternative, if this court finds that departur1 
from the statutory allocation formula is justified, plain 
tiff cannot be taxed on any amount exceeding its overal 
net income from its operations within and without th1 
state. 
Further in the alternative, if allocated net incom1 
can exceed total net income of the plaintiff, a deductior 
for federal income taxes on an "equivalent" basis i1 
required for a correct separate accounting determinatior 
of net income. 
The deficiency assessed by the State Tax Commis· 
sion should be cancelled and this case remanded to thi 
Commission for determination of franchise taxes du1 
pursuant to the opinion of the Court. 
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